Iranian Journal of Finance

Abstract As a key tool in implementing monetary policy and government financing, government bonds play an essential role in financial markets. By means of Islamic financial innovations in the Islamic capital market, the instrument of Islamic treasury bill is published and tradable in the over-the-counter market. Islamic treasury bills have many risks in terms of execution, including the ease of trading and liquidity in the secondary market. Therefore, this research aims to examine some microstructural elements of government bonds using a vector autoregressive model. In this article, the effect of trading volume on bid-ask spread of orders has been investigated. To survey the impact of these variables, the vector autoregressive (VAR) model has been used on intraday data of 17 symbols of Islamic treasury bills in the over-the-counter market, which had the most trading days from 2021 to September 2023. According to the studies, there is a significant relationship between the trading volume and bid-ask spread only in Islamic treasury bills with long-term maturity. Therefore, the effect of the bid-ask spread of orders in different periods is greater than the trading volume, especially in longer-term Islamic treasury bills. Hence, in this research, by analyzing the impulse response function, if there is a shock on the variables, the effect of the trading volume's shock remains for several periods and affects unremarkably the bid-ask spread of orders in most of the short-term and long-term Islamic treasury bills, while effects of the bid-ask spread shocks during initial periods for long-term and short-term Islamic treasury bills is excellent, but decrease sharply during the following periods. These results help traders pay attention and reduce the risk of trading in the over-the-counter market, specifically the long-term treasury bills.

Abstract This study aims to explore the dynamics of financial contracting in Iranian startups and high-tech companies, with a particular focus on the challenges posed by information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs. We collected and analyzed data from 123 Iranian Shareholder Agreements (ShAs). We employed a range of descriptive statistics to provide a comprehensive summary of the data. Also, to explore the relationships between our variables, we utilized Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The terms and conditions of these contracts were examined to understand the diversity and influence of these terms and how they are applied in the real world in the context of Iran. We also investigated Iranian venture capitalists' behavior in obtaining cash flow rights and control rights, and a complete description is presented through various factors, including components of cash flow rights and control rights. Our analysis revealed a limited diversity in the terms and conditions of the contracts, suggesting a potential emulation of U.S. ShAs. We found that Iranian venture capitalists tend to secure maximum cash flow and control rights, exceeding their U.S. counterparts. Preferred stocks emerged as the primary choice for investing in startup companies. However, a detailed examination of the relationship between cash flow rights and control rights indicated a lack of a unified and coherent approach in contract design, reflecting a highly conservative stance among investors. This study contributes to understanding financial contracting dynamics in emerging markets like Iran. It highlights the gap between theoretical frameworks and real-world practices, shedding light on how these factors shape the relationships between investors and entrepreneurs.

Abstract Corporate integrity is considered as part of the company's development strategies, which in the long run can lead to the increased firms' financial transparency to stakeholders. The purpose of our study is to present a corporate integrity model and, then to investigate its effect on firms' information asymmetry. In this study, to measure the corporate integrity, we use Meta-synthesis and Delphi analysis in the qualitative part. Then, in the quantitative section, the corporate integrity questionnaires were sent to the managers of the sample firms. Subsequently, a total of 138 questionnaires were completed and sent back, which were used as the final samples for analysis. In addition, information asymmetry is measured using the three different proxies, namely bid-ask spread, turnover, and Amihud illiquidity measure. Our findings show a significant and negative effect of corporate integrity on information asymmetry. This results suggest that corporate integrity, by promoting behavioral values based on truthfulness and commitment, the structures will enhance the corporate governance mechanisms and, thereby, firstly motivate the managers to reduce the agency gap and, secondly, implement a more effective level of the supervisions on the firm's performances in front of the stakeholders by accelerating the circulation of information and giving timely and reliable feedback to the stakeholders. This is the first study that presents a corporate integrity model through qualitative analysis and then, investigates the effect of corporate integrity on firms' information asymmetry. Therefore, our study can contribute to the extant literature of this context.

Abstract The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between Political Communication and Information Asymmetry with the efficiency of investment in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. To achieve the above goal, two hypotheses were formulated. To test research hypotheses, a sample consisting of 109 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2014 to 2019 was selected. And a panel regression model based on composite data was used which has independent and dependent variables. The results of this study show that Political Communication has a negative and significant impact on Investment Efficiency, In contrast, Information Asymmetry has a positive and significant impact on Investment Efficiency, and this means that with increasing information asymmetry, investment efficiency increases. Therefore, political communications prefer corporate resources to pursue profitable investment options, thus altering corporate investment behaviors and reducing corporate investment efficiency. The results also show that Information asymmetry prevents investors from commenting on investment opportunities, thus allowing local managers to take advantage of profitable investment options.

Abstract Information flow is a key parameter in an economic activity that acts as the main factor in the capital market emergence, stability, and efficiency. The purpose of the current research is to investigate the effect of the environmental points of cooperate governance on the pricing of information asymmetry. In this regard, we have extracted data related to companies accepted in the "Tehran Stock Exchange" from 2009 to 2018, and a panel-data regression model was utilized to test research hypnosis. The results show that information asymmetry and environmental points of cooperate governance have a significant effect on the expected return (cost of capital) on an investment. In addition, the effect of environmental points of cooperate governance on the relationship between the information asymmetry and the cost of capital has been verified. Finally, the results show that environmental points of cooperate governance leads to the differences in the cost of capital in the different levels of information asymmetry.